Unsnarling the World-Knot: Consciousness, Freedom, and the Mind-Body ProblemThe mind-body problem, which Schopenhauer called the "world-knot," has been a central problem for philosophy since the time of Descartes. Among realists--those who accept the reality of the physical world--the two dominant approaches have been dualism and materialism, but there is a growing consensus that, if we are ever to understand how mind and body are related, a radically new approach is required. David Ray Griffin develops a third form of realism, one that resolves the basic problem (common to dualism and materialism) of the continued acceptance of the Cartesian view of matter. In dialogue with various philosophers, including Dennett, Kim, McGinn, Nagel, Seager, Searle, and Strawson, Griffin shows that materialist physicalism is even more problematic than dualism. He proposes instead a panexperientialist physicalism grounded in the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. Answering those who have rejected "panpsychism" as obviously absurd, Griffin argues compellingly that panexperientialism, by taking experience and spontaneity as fully natural, can finally provide a naturalistic account of the emergence of consciousness--an account that also does justice to the freedom we all suppose in practice. |
Contents
| 9 | |
| 15 | |
Problems of Dualism and Materialism and Their Common Root | 46 |
The Neglected Alternative | 77 |
Matter Consciousness and the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness | 117 |
Compound Individuals and Freedom | 163 |
Supervenience and Panexperientialist Physicalism | 218 |
| 249 | |
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Unsnarling the World-knot: Consciousness, Freedom, and the Mind-body Problem David Ray Griffin No preview available - 1998 |
Common terms and phrases
accordingly actual entity affirm aggregational societies Alfred North Whitehead argument assumption behavior belief bodily body brain Cartesian Cartesian dualism causal efficacy cause cells chapter common sense compatibilism compound individuals conception conscious experience consciousness definition Descartes determined difficulty distinction efficient causation emergence ence enduring individuals epiphenomenalism example existence experiential explanation externalist extrasensory perception fact feeling find first freedom Galen Strawson hard-core commonsense idea influence introspection intuitions involves Kim’s kind materialists matter McGinn means mental metaphysical mind mind-body problem mode monism Nagel neurons objects occasions of experience one’s ontological panexperientialism panexperientialist panpsychism panpsychists Parapsychology Peter Strawson philosophers physicalist position prehension presuppose in practice properties Psychical Psychokinesis quantum reality reason regulative principle rejecting relation rience says scientific Seager Searle Searle’s self-determination sensory perception simply spatial Strawson sufficient suggests supervenience theory tion unified units of nature unity universe Whitehead