Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency
Colonel Gian Gentile’s 2008 article “Misreading the Surge” in World Politics Review first exposed a growing rift among military intellectuals that has since been playing out in strategy sessions at the Pentagon, in classrooms at military academies, and on the pages of the New York Times. While the past years of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan have been dominated by the doctrine of counterinsurgency (COIN), Gentile and a small group of dissident officers and defense analysts have questioned the necessity and efficacy of COIN—essentially armed nation-building—in achieving the United States’ limited core policy objective in Afghanistan: the destruction of Al Qaeda.
Drawing both on the author’s experiences as a combat battalion commander in the Iraq War and his research into the application of counterinsurgency in a variety of historical contexts, Wrong Turn is a brilliant summation of Gentile’s views of the failures of COIN, as well as a searing reevaluation of the current state of affairs in Afghanistan.
As the issue of America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan inevitably rises to the top of the national agenda, Wrong Turn will be a major new touchstone for what went wrong and a vital new guide to the way forward.
Note: the ideas in this book are the author’s alone, not the Department of Defense’s.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
The Conceit of American Counterinsurgency
The Construction of the Counterinsurgency Narrative
Malaya The Foundation of the Counterinsurgency Narrative
Vietnam The First Better War That Wasnt
Iraq A Better War Version 2
Afghanistan Another Better War That Wasnt
Other editions - View all
Abrams Afghan al Qaeda American army American counterinsurgency American military argued army’s attacks Baghdad better better-war thesis brigades Briggs Plan British Army campaign Casey Papers Chin Peng civil civilians COIN Colonel combat battalion command counterin counterinsurgency counterinsurgency narrative counterinsurgency warfare David McKiernan David Petraeus defeat Defense doctrine early Easter Offensive effort enemy February fighting fought gency Gurkha hearts and minds historian Infantry insurgents interview Iraq and Afghanistan Iraqi jungle killed Lieutenant Malaya Malayan Emergency manual Marine McChrystal McKiernan Military History Military Review months myth Nagl nation building North noted Obama October Offensive officers operational framework pacification Petraeus’s PLAF political population President Qaeda resettlement Ricks Robert security forces senior Shia Small Wars Journal soldiers strategy Sunni insurgents surge of troops surgency tactics Taliban Tet Offensive tion U.S. Army U.S. military United University Press victory Viet Cong Vietnam War village Washington Westmoreland winning York