Control and Game Models of the Greenhouse Effect: Economics Essays on the Comedy and Tragedy of the Commons
This book deals with economic policy regarding the Greenhouse Effect using control and game models. First, a literature review is given of intertemporal optimisation models of environmental issues with special focus on the Greenhouse Effect. Next, the issue of sustainability is discussed for different specifications of the natural assimilation function. Furthermore, capital accumulation is considered both in abatement and in human capital. The international dimension is analysed next with focus on the difference between feedback and open-loop solutions, as well as on cooperative outcomes using trigger and renegotiation-proof strategies. Finally, second best forms of cooperation in the form of "issue linkage" and "technology transfers" are worked out.
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Control and Game Models of the Greenhouse Effect: Economics Essays on the ...
Herman S.J. Cesar
No preview available - 1994
abatement analysed assimilation function assimilative capacity assumed asymmetric Barbier & Markandya benchmark build-up capital accumulation capital stock carbon CFCs changes Chapter consumption control variables costs Dasgupta decentralised defined differential games discount rate discussed dynamic economic emission charges emission reduction emission-reduction energy energy-related capital environmental resources equations feedback Nash feedback solution fossil fuel given global Greenhouse Effect Greenhouse gases growth Hence human capital impact increase input intertemporal investment issue level of pollution linear linear-quadratic linkage marginal maximise means Nash equilibrium non-cooperative Nordhaus Note open-loop open-loop Nash open-loop solution optimal control optimisation order conditions output parameter Pareto dominated Pareto optimal Pay-off matrix Phase Plane physical capital player Ploeg & Withagen possible problem production function punishment reneges renegotiation proof Riccati Riccati equations roughly offsetting Section sector social optimum social welfare function specification Spence & Zeckhauser stock of pollution sustainability Table taxes technology transfers Theorem trigger strategies uncertainty zero