Control and Game Models of the Greenhouse Effect: Economics Essays on the Comedy and Tragedy of the CommonsThis book deals with economic policy regarding the Greenhouse Effect using control and game models. First, a literature review is given of intertemporal optimisation models of environmental issues with special focus on the Greenhouse Effect. Next, the issue of sustainability is discussed for different specifications of the natural assimilation function. Furthermore, capital accumulation is considered both in abatement and in human capital. The international dimension is analysed next with focus on the difference between feedback and open-loop solutions, as well as on cooperative outcomes using trigger and renegotiation-proof strategies. Finally, second best forms of cooperation in the form of "issue linkage" and "technology transfers" are worked out. |
Contents
| 2 | |
Chapter 1 | 62 |
117 | 70 |
13 | 76 |
28 | 82 |
32 | 93 |
Multi Country Modelling of the Greenhouse Effect | 117 |
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Control and Game Models of the Greenhouse Effect: Economics Essays on the ... Herman S.J. Cesar No preview available - 1994 |
Common terms and phrases
abatement analysed assimilation function assimilative capacity assumed assumption asymmetric benchmark build-up calculated capital accumulation carbon taxes changes chapter co-state coefficients constraint consumption continuation pay-off control variables costs decentralised defined differential games discount rate discussed dynamic economy emission charges emission reduction emission-reduction energy-related capital environmental resources feedback Nash feedback solution fossil fuel GHG concentration given global Greenhouse Effect Greenhouse gases Hence higher human capital impact increase investment issue joint linear linear-quadratic linkage m₁ Mäler marginal maximises means Nash equilibrium non-cooperative non-linear Nordhaus Note open-loop open-loop Nash optimal control optimisation order conditions output parameter Pareto dominated Pareto optimal Pay-off matrix Phase Plane physical capital Planner player possible problem production function punishment reneges renegotiation proof Riccati Riccati equations roughly offsetting Section sector social optimum social welfare function specification steady state level steady state values sustainability Table technology transfers Theorem trigger strategies zero ән ӘР