## ICM Millennium Lectures on GamesLeon A. Petrosjan, David W.K. Yeung Since the first Congress in Zürich in 1897, the ICM has been an eagerly awaited event every four years. Many of these occasions are celebrated for historie developments and seminal contributions to mathematics. 2002 marks the year of the 24th ICM, the first of the new millennium. Also historie is the first ICM Satellite Conference devoted to game theory and applications. It is one of those rare occasions, in which masters of the field are able to meet under congenial surroundings to talk and share their gathered wisdom. As is usually the case in ICM meetings, participants of the ICM Satellite Conference on Game Theory and Applications (Qingdao, August 2(02) hailed from the four corners of the world. In addition to presentations of high qual ity research, the program also included twelve invited plenary sessions with distinguished speakers. This volume, which gathers together selected papers read at the conference, is divided into four sections: (I) Foundations, Concepts, and Structure. (II) Equilibrium Properties. (III) Applications to the Natural and Social Sciences. (IV) Computational Aspects of Games. |

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### Contents

3 | |

Banzhaf Permission Values for Games with a Permission | 21 |

Moral Hazard in Teams Revisited | 47 |

Endogenous Determination of Utility | 75 |

Nperson Prisoners Dilemma with Mutual Choice | 89 |

RandomlyFurcating Stochastic Differential Games | 107 |

On Modulo 2 Game | 127 |

Extensions of Hart and MasColells Consistency to Efficient | 147 |

Network Topology and the Efficiency of Equilibrium | 232 |

Essential Components of the Set of Weakly ParetoNash | 267 |

Discretization of Information Collecting Situations | 281 |

On The Chinese Postman Game | 297 |

International Emissions Trading with AgentBased Simulation | 319 |

Comparison of two Economic Models for a Businessto | 335 |

Numerical Algorithm for Solving CrossCoupled | 358 |

Effects of Symmetry on Paradoxes in NonCooperative | 373 |

On the Stability of Cooperation Structures | 166 |

TimeConsistent Imputation Distribution | 185 |

The Core in the Presence of Externalities | 205 |

Computation of Stackelberg Trajectories in a Class of Linear | 391 |

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agents algorithm allocation rule assume assumption axioms Banzhaf permission value behavior characteristic function computable condition consider consistent cooperative game corresponding cost function Cournot duopoly data mining database defined Definition denote differential games duopoly game dynamics Economic edge equation equilibrium cost example exists extensive form game firms flow vector fo(n form game game offer Game Theory given grand coalition graph Hence IBM Server implies independent routes individual induction Lemma linear maximize monotonicity N-IPD Nash equilibrium network with independent node optimal outcome paper paradox Pareto efficient partition function payoff functions permission structure player property player set players with Blow predecessor fairness problem Proof Proposition reduced game respectively result satisfies sequential equilibrium series-parallel network Shapley value solution solution concepts stable matchings stochastic strategy profile subset symmetry Theorem TU-game unilateral choice unique users vertex vertices Visual Studio