The Morality of Freedom
Ranging over central issues of morals and politics and the nature of freedom and authority, this study examines the role of value-neutrality, rights, equality, and the prevention of harm in the liberal tradition, and relates them to fundamental moral questions such as the relation of values to social forms, the comparability of values, and the significance of personal commitments.
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ability accept affect agent argument aspects attitude autonomy-based belief benefit chapter choice choose circumstances claim coercion common conception concern conflict consent consequentialism consequentialist considerations constitutional culture decision deny deontological depends derive desires doctrine duty egalitarian principles entitled equal establish example existence explain expression fact fundamental goals ground H. L. A. Hart harm principle ideal important incommensurability independent individual institutions interest intrinsically valuable J. L. Mackie judgment justified Kantian legitimate authority liberal liberty means merely moral theory neutrality normative Nozick obligation to obey one's options P. M. S. Hacker people's personal autonomy political authority political freedom possible pre-emption presumption presumption of liberty promise protection pursue pursuit Rawls Rawlsian reasons for action regard relations relationship relevant requires respect right-based right-holder role self-interest sense significance social forms society sometimes Theory of Justice utilitarianism valid value-pluralism veil of ignorance well-being wrong