Intergovernmental relations and economic management in China
This book examines how China's decentralization process has affected and will affect the country's macroeconomic performance and the market function. With an innovative application of game theory, the author develops an analytical framework that can explain the behaviour of the central and local governments under alternative institutional environments. The study also suggests how to establish desirable rules of games in China's political and economic institutions through appropriate reforms. This book is particularly suitable for students and researchers studying the Chinese economy, but it will also appeal to economists and political scientists working on intergovernmental relations in other countries
xv, 188 pages ; 23 cm
9780333660072, 9780312161118, 0333660072, 0312161115
36261587
List of Tables
List of Figures
Acknowledgements
List of Abbreviations
Introduction
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Macroeconomic Management
Central Governmental Credibility and Local Tax Efforts: A Game Theoretic Model
Central Government Transfer under Soft Budget Constraint
Intergovernmental Relations and Monetary Management
Central Government Credibility and Monetary Expansion: A Game Theoretic Model
Intergovernmental Relations and Market Development
Bibliography
Index