Dynamic Bi-level Optimal Toll Design Approach for Dynamic Traffic Networks |
Contents
Microfoundations of road pricing a game theory approach 43 | 3 |
work | 5 |
elaboration of key concepts | 19 |
Copyright | |
10 other sections not shown
Common terms and phrases
assumed bi-level Chapter congestion constraints corridor network decisions departure time choice depending design variables different policy objectives DOTD problem DTA model dynamic network dynamic tolls dynamic traffic assignment Equation eur/min eur/passage experiments Figure game theory given heterogeneous users high VOT link travel low VOT lower level market power mathematically formulated minimizing total travel monopoly game MPEC N-player game Nash equilibrium non-cooperative game objective function optimal toll design optimal toll values parameters path flows payoff values players preferred departure pure strategies road authority road pricing problem route and departure route choice schedule delay Section solution solve Stackelberg game studies toll design game toll design problem toll levels toll pattern tolling regime total toll revenues total travel utility TRAIL Thesis Series transportation network travel behavior travel cost function travel demand travel time functions traveler class trip choice upper level user classes user equilibrium variable tolls variational inequality Verhoef VOT and VOSD